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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have shown that aggregate CPU usage and power
consumption traces on smartphones can leak information about
applications running on the system or websites visited. In response,
access to such data has been blocked for mobile applications start-
ing from Android 7. In this work, we explore a new source of side-
channel leakage for this class of aacks. Our method is based on
the fact that electromagnetic activity caused by mobile processors
leads to noticeable disturbances in magnetic sensor measurements
on mobile devices, with the amplitude being proportional to the
CPU workload. erefore, recorded sensor data can be analyzed
to reveal information about ongoing activities. e aack works
on a number of devices: We evaluated 59 models of modern smart-
phones and tablets and observed the reaction of the magnetometer
to CPU activity on 39 of them. On selected devices we were able
to successfully identify which application has been opened (with
up to 90% accuracy) or which web page has been loaded (up to 91%
accuracy). We believe that the presented side channel poses a signif-
icant risk to end users’ privacy, as the sensor data can be recorded
from native apps and even from web pages without user permis-
sions. Finally, we discuss possible countermeasures to prevent the
presented information leakage.
1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have become ubiquitous in people’s daily activities.
According to recent studies, adults spend more than 2.5 hours per
day on their smartphones or tablets [33], the average user runs over
30 mobile applications per month [44], while mobile Internet trac
already exceeded desktop usage [25]. Such extensive mobile usage
results in an increasing amount of personal information that is
processed on mobile devices, which increases risks of its malicious
misuse. Fortunately, mobile operating system developers put a great
deal of eort to limit such risks, by isolating running applications
into sandboxed environments and by introducing permission-based
access restrictions for sensitive components [5, 16].
Nevertheless, several previous studies have shown that an at-
tacker can exploit side-channel leakage to infer information about
applications and websites opened on a victim’s mobile device. ese
leakage sources include data-usage statistics [41, 49], power con-
sumption traces [22, 46], CPU utilization [40, 48], memory usage
statistics [21, 29], and other system information available through
the procfs lesystem [42]. e information obtained through appli-
cation and website ngerprinting can potentially reveal sensitive
information about the user, e.g., hobbies, political interests, reli-
gious beliefs, or health conditions. e more actively a victim uses
the device, the more precise is the resulting user prole.
To prevent such aack vectors, operating system developers
gradually restrict access to system resources which can reveal sen-
sitive information. In particular, starting from Android 7, applica-
tions cannot access pseudoles revealing system information about
other processes (e.g., /proc/[PID]) and monitor trac statistics of
other applications [4]. Starting from Android 8 and on the most
recent Android 9, the access to procfs and sysfs pseudo lesystems
is further restricted on non-rooted devices [9], preventing applica-
tion and website ngerprinting aacks based on system statistics,
including CPU utilization and power consumption traces.
In this paper, we propose an alternative source of side-channel
leakage for website and application ngerprinting on mobile de-
vices, based on the reaction of magnetometer sensors to CPU ac-
tivity. It has recently been shown that peak CPU activity on a
smartphone can cause a noticeable disturbance in magnetic sensor
measurements [34]. Authors utilized this reaction to establish a
covert channel, by encoding a payload into paerns of very high and
idle CPU activity and analyzing the produced sensor disturbance.
In this work, we propose to use this side channel to passively ana-
lyze running activities. We show that magnetometer disturbance
paerns actually correlate with CPU workload, and therefore allow
to ngerprint browsing and application activity with an accuracy
comparable to the method based on observing overall CPU statistics
available through procfs before Android 8. e proposed method
does not require any user permissions at the moment. As a result,
any application installed on a device can establish ngerprinting
unnoticeable to the end user. Furthermore, the magnetometer can
now be accessed within web pages using the recently-introduced
Generic Sensor API [45]. In this case, the aack does not even
require an installed malicious application. Instead, any web page
under the aacker’s control can establish ngerprinting of other
web pages or applications.
We have examined 59 popular smartphones and tablets, and
have found that magnetometers on 39 of them are aected by CPU
activity. For these devices, we created a classier which analyzes
disturbances in recorded sensor measurements to identify activities
on a device. In practical scenarios, we are able to identify an opened
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website with an accuracy of up to 91% for a set of 50 popular
websites. We were also able to identify a running application with
up to 90% accuracy for a set of 65 candidate applications. In all
cases, the accuracy is signicantly higher than the baseline accuracy
obtained from random guessing, and is comparable to the approach
based on analyzing procfs information. erefore, the presented
side channel can pose signicant privacy risks to end users.
1.1 Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We investigate the reaction of magnetic sensors in mo-
bile devices to varying CPU activity on 59 dierent smart-
phones and tablets in cloud and lab environments. To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the rst to test this side
channel on a large number of modern Android devices.
• We propose to exploit this side channel for application and
website ngerprinting on mobile devices. We show how
to extract information from magnetometer disturbances,
evaluate the classication performance under realistic con-
ditions, and discuss possible countermeasures.
• We show that our method provides classication accuracy
comparable to techniques based on procfs leakage, but
works in presence of security enhancements implemented
in the latest Android versions, and can be run in both in-
app (malicious app) and in-browser (malicious web page)
scenarios.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background information, describing the
use of magnetometers in mobile devices and show the reaction of
magnetometers to electromagnetic activity caused by the CPU.
2.1 Magnetometers
Most modern smartphones and tablets are equipped with magnetic
sensors, also called magnetometers. ese sensors measure the
ambient geomagnetic eld intensity for all three physical axes in
micro Tesla, usually by utilizing the Hall eect [19]. Normally, they
are used to estimate the orientation of the device relative to earth’s
magnetic north and in this way act as digital compasses, e.g., to
show the user’s current direction in navigation applications.
In Android native applications, 3-axis magnetometer values can
be retrieved by using the Sensor API class [12]. Depending on
a device, the sampling rate is limited by the operating system to
50–100Hz. Access to the sensor does not require any explicit per-
missions, and therefore, any installed application can read sensor
measurements without user aention. In web applications, magne-
tometer data can be accessed using the recently introduced Generic
Sensor API [45]. e API is released in Google Chrome and Opera
web browsers, but requires a conguration ag to be enabled [38].
In comparison to native APIs, it has additional limitations: First,
the data can be accessed only from the foreground tabs, and only
for web pages opened using HTTPS. Second, the sampling rate is
limited to 10 Hz. Nevertheless, we present aack scenarios which
work even in the presence of these limitations (Section 3), while
our experiments (Section 5.2) show that a sampling rate of 10 Hz
does not prevent the side channel.
2.2 Reaction of magnetometers to CPU activity
As it has been discovered in prior work [27, 35], the magnetometer
on mobile devices is susceptible to the electromagnetic radiation
emanated from electronic devices located nearby. In particular,
high CPU workload on a device typically requires more power,
which results in a higher magnetic eld produced by the power-
supplying wires. Matyunin et al. [34] showed that this eect is
observable on a smartphone: Very high CPU activity on a Nexus
5X smartphone (close to 100% of the CPU load) led to a noticeable
peak in magnetometer measurements.
In this work, we further investigate the reaction of magnetome-
ters to CPU activity on mobile devices. We have observed that on
many smartphones the paern of the sensor disturbance generally
correlates with the CPU activity. e reasons for this are the follow-
ing: On one hand, the CPU is one of the most power-consuming
components of the device [20]. (the screen and GSM module can
consume more power, but their consumption remains comparably
stable during normal usage). On the other hand, mobile proces-
sors are optimized to consume minimum power under low or idle
activity.
At the same time, dierent applications or websites require dif-
ferent amounts of CPU resources when running. As a result, CPU
utilization traces, as well as the corresponding sensor disturbance,
can contain distinct paerns which uniquely identify the activity.
Figure 1 shows CPU utilization traces recorded on a smartphone
for two applications, in combination with magnetometer readings
recorded at the same time. e paerns in the corresponding CPU
and sensor measurements are visually correlated for each applica-
tion, they are stable within multiple recordings, but distinct for two
dierent applications. In this work, we show that an adversary can
eectively extract information out of such recorded magnetome-
ter measurements, and use it to perform application and website
ngerprinting on a victim’s device.
3 ATTACK SCENARIO
In this section, we discuss two considered aack scenarios, in-
app and in-browser, discuss their limitations and elaborate on the
considered assumptions.
In the in-app scenario, the victim installs an aacker-controlled
application on his or her device. is application does not require
privileged access rights from the system and does not have addi-
tional user permissions, apart from access to the Internet, granted
by default. erefore, malicious code can be hidden in any appli-
cation which victims are likely to install. is application can be
sandboxed according to the latest Android security enhancements.
In particular, this application does not have any information about
other running applications or network trac, and does not have
access to system resources over procfs or sysfs. e aacker only
has access to zero-permission sensor information.
In the in-browser scenario, a victim opens a web page under
the aacker’s control. e web page either fully belongs to the
aacker, or contains components from an aacker-controlled server,
similarly to the case when websites include third-party code from
advertisement and analytics services. Such third-party components
can be present on thousands of websites, which makes this scenario
comparably even more scalable. Similarly, we assume that this web
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Figure 1: Examples of CPU utilization and magnetometer measurements, recorded during opening two applications on a
Google Pixel 2 smartphone. Plots represent mean and standard deviation for 175 samples. e CPU and sensor data are
visually correlated with each other for each application and are signicantly dierent between applications.
page is sandboxed by the browser from other web pages, processes
and system resources.
In both scenarios, an aacker constantly collects and analyzes
magnetometer readings and tries to identify opened applications
and/or websites by applying a supervised learning approach. To
achieve this, the aacker needs to perform a training phase, which
requires gathering a sucient set of labeled traces for each visited
website or application. A powerful aacker can perform learning
on a large number of devices which he or she owns or accesses
using cloud testing platforms, such as AWS Device Farm [6]. On
a victim’s device, the aacker only collects traces to be classied
during the testing phase and sends them to a server. e aacker
may additionally send information about the victim’s device to a
server, to match the victim’s device with same model of the device
that aacker trained on, as model-specic classication has a higher
success rate (we evaluate this in Section 5.2). On Android, the device
model is freely accessible by applications through the Build.MODEL
property. In the in-browser scenario, this device model can be
obtained from the User-Agent HTTP header [11].
Alternatively, for the website ngerprinting case, an aacker
can perform the learning phase directly on the victim’s device.
For this purpose, a malicious application can embed an invisible
WebView [14] component to open all websites from the the training
dataset and send the labeled sensor data to an aacker-controlled
server. Although such an approach would provide the most precise
device-specic training dataset, in this case, the application needs
to be actively used in the foreground by the victim for a signicant
amount of time.
3.1 Applicability of the scenarios
e in-app and in-browser aack scenarios also dier regarding
their applicability. Due to technical limitations of the Generic
Sensor API discussed in Section 2.1, the magnetometer can only be
accessed from foreground browser tabs. erefore, the in-browser
scenario can be applied to either identify background activities, or
websites and applications opened side by side with the recording
web page, in so-called split screen mode.
In the in-app scenario, the time frame during which the mali-
cious application can gather magnetometer traces depends on the
Android version: Starting from Android 8, the background exe-
cution of applications is limited to several minutes aer the last
user interaction with the application [7]; in the newest Android
9, sensors cannot be accessed in the background by default [1].
To be able to continuously record sensors in the background on
Android 8 and 9, the aacker needs to declare a so-called Fore-
groundService [12], which results in a visible user notication. is
notication, however, can be masqueraded as a seemingly benign
functionality which needs to be constantly running, e.g., a tness
activity tracker. Nevertheless, in all cases, a foreground malicious
application would be able to classify background activity or activity
opened in split screen mode. Table 1 summarizes the dierences
between the in-app and in-browser scenarios.
3.2 Additional assumptions
Following other works on website and application ngerprinting,
we consider several additional assumptions [30]. In this section, we
reason about these assumptions with regard to our scenarios, and
show that many of them can be encountered on modern mobile
platforms, in comparison to traditional desktop systems.
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Table 1: Comparison between the in-app and in-browser attack scenarios
In-app scenario In-browser scenario
Recorder native app web page
Sensor access Sensor API Generic Sensor API
Sampling rate 50–100Hz 10Hz
Background recording Android ≤ 7: full
Android 8&9: partial
(with notication)
n/a
Aack code distribution Application markets Phishing web links or
3rd-party JavaScript inclusions
Scalability medium high
First, it is typically assumed that users open applications (web-
sites) sequentially and have only a single active application (website)
open at a time. is assumption is reasonable for our scenarios, as
on mobile devices a user can not keep more than two applications
in the foreground at a time, with two only in split-screen mode.
Furthermore, modern mobile browsers signicantly limit JavaScript
execution in background tabs or even completely prevent it, to re-
duce power consumption. As a result, in a general case only one
application remains active at a time, and, in case of a web browser,
only one tab can be active.
Second, we assume that there is no user-invoked activity in the
background. As described in Section 3.1, modern Android systems
limit execution time of background processes. We conrmed that
these limitations result in low average background activity. We
performed the test measurement of the average CPU activity over
a period of 24 hours on two devices with numerous applications
installed and the recording application in the foreground. As a
result, we obtained the average CPU utilization of only 1.9%, with
the standard deviation of 1.7%. Furthermore, in the course of our
experiments we did not take any measures to specically prevent
background activity. We performed our measurements on unmod-
ied smartphones, with up to 60 additional popular applications
installed. ese applications could potentially generate CPU noise
in the background during the continuous recording (over 30 hours
of recording per device and tested scenario). Nevertheless, the high
classication rates show that these activities do not signicantly
aect the recording traces. Overall, we can expect that the impact
of background acitivtiy on the classication is low.
ird, we present evaluation results under the assumption that
websites (applications) do not change over time. As observed in our
experiments and other works (e.g., see [30, 47]), this assumption
does not hold for websites, and the aacker needs to periodically
re-run the learning phase. However, we observed that traces from
applications remain stable unless they get updated. In addition,
conguration options of the browser are comparably limited on
mobile devices, so it is easier for the aacker to replicate the user
client-side seings.
Finally, it is generally assumed that the aacker can detect the
beginning and end of each activity to be classied. In practice, this
can be hard to achieve: In our case, any CPU activity performed
on a device can cause magnetic disturbances. As one potential
solution, we show in Section 4.4 that the aacker can identify
potential time points when the target activity could have started by
computing the cross-correlation with the predened paern, and
run the classication only at these specic points.
Apart from these assumptions, typically addressed in works on
website and application ngerprinting, in this work we additionally
assume that the victim is not actively moving the device, as move-
ments aect magnetometer data. In Section 5.5, we evaluate the
impact of minor movements on the classication accuracy when
the smartphone is being held in hand. Furthermore, in Section 4.5,
we propose an approach how the aacker can identify and lter
out sensor readings which are disturbed by movements.
As a result, we believe that our scenarios are realistic under given
assumptions.
4 ATTACK DETAILS
In this section, we discuss implementation details about how data
was collected, its pre-processing, feature extraction and classi-
cation, describe approaches to identify the target activity in the
continuous measurement stream and to identify traces disturbed
by device movements.
4.1 Data collection
To collect a large set of labeled traces in the learning phase, we
trigger opening applications and websites from our datasets in an
automated way, using the Android Debug Bridge (adb) [2] tool. Our
service script opens each application from the dataset, waits for a
predened duration, and closes the target application. Similarly, for
website ngerprinting, the service script opens the Chrome browser
and the corresponding website. Additionally, we implement open-
ing websites in a separate application with an embedded WebView
component. It allows us to evaluate the website ngerprinting in
the cloud testing platforms, such as the AWS Device Farm [6]. ese
platforms allow developers to test mobile applications remotely on
multiple devices. However, they do not provide access to devices
through the adb. erefore, we could not evaluate the application
ngerprinting or use the Chrome browser on these platforms.
To collect resulting magnetometer disturbance traces, we im-
plemented an Android application which runs in the background,
records 3-axis magnetometer data, and sends it to the aacker-
controlled server. Similarly, for the in-browser scenario, we imple-
mented a web page which records the sensors using the Generic
Sensor API in the mobile Chrome browser, and sends the data to
the server. As a result, for each opened application or website, the
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server receives labeled (in the learning phase) or unlabeled (in the
testing phase) sensor measurements.
4.2 Data preprocessing
Subsequently, we convert the raw 3-axis data trace into a discrete-
time one-dimensional trace. For this purpose, we apply Principal
Component Analysis [28] to the data, choosing the rst component
as the result. e resulting data represents the one-dimensional
axis with the highest data variance. Assuming that the orientation
of the device is not changed signicantly and that the ambient
magnetic eld together with EM noise is constant at a given point
in time, this variance represents the vector of the EM emanation
caused by the CPU. e disturbance in the one-dimensional trace
can be directed above or below the baseline level. erefore, we
add both the original recorded trace and its inverse with regard to
the baseline to the dataset in the training phase of the classier,
considering both traces as representations of the corresponding
CPU paern.
Finally, we normalize the result to the range [0–1], so the result-
ing values do not depend on the maximum possible amplitude of
the disturbance (which is device-specic, see Section 5.1). Instead,
the result contains information about the “shape” of the paern,
which represents the unique CPU activity paern.
4.3 Feature extraction and data classication
Finally, we divide the resulting normalized discrete-time values
of the axis with the biggest variance into equal-size overlapping
intervals (bins) and calculate the mean value within each bin. ese
mean values are used as features for classication. To classify the
traces, we use a Random Forest [18] machine learning classier,
as it outperforms other algorithms in our experiments in terms of
resulting classication accuracy. We split the dataset into training
set (80%) and test set (20%). e 5-fold cross-validation is performed
on the training set to select optimal hyperparameters using the
grid search, which include the number of estimators in the forest,
the maximum number of features, and the maximum depth of the
tree. e test set was only used to compute the accuracies when
evaluating the classier in our experiments.
4.4 Identifying target activity during
continuous usage
As we discussed in Section 3.2, the aacker is assumed to know the
beginning of the activity to be classied. In our case, the aacker
needs to continuously monitor magnetometer disturbances, which
can be caused by any application.
However, if the practical goal of the ngerprinting is to identify
whether the victim opens a particular target application or a website,
we propose the following approach to reduce the amount of data
to be processed by the classier. First, the aacker can compute an
averaged CPU activity paern for the target activity by computing
mean values along multiple traces for this activity (known from
the learning phase). en, this paern can be used to calculate the
cross-correlation with the continuously recorded data. If the target
activity was produced within the recorded interval, a strong peak
is present in the cross-correlation result. In practice, however, due
to noise and slight changes in the produced activity paerns, cross-
correlation results will not have a single strong peak, but multiple
potential peaks. However, due to similarity in actual and averaged
paerns, one can expect that the actual time point corresponds to
one of these peaks. erefore, the classication can be run only
at time points where peaks are present in the cross-correlation
result with a predened threshold. is threshold sets a trade-o
between the number of peaks and the accuracy of peak detection.
We evaluate this approach in Section 5.4.
Interestingly, for website ngerprinting, an aacker can also
perform this step on recorded data to rst detect the web browser
application to be opened (as an application ngerprinting task), and
then classify the recorded interval aer the browser was opened.
4.5 Identifying device movements
If the victim rotates the device, a corresponding change in the global
orientation and relative direction to the magnetic north will cause
a shi in magnetometer readings along three axes. In this case, the
PCA-based trace will no longer represent disturbance exclusively
caused by CPU activity.
To identify and lter out traces which are aected by movements,
we propose to analyze the rotation rate measurements from the
gyroscope sensor simultaneously with the magnetometer. Access
to gyroscope also does not require permissions, and its data is
not aected by the CPU activity. erefore, the aacker can use
gyroscope readings to estimate if the device has been signicantly
moved, by seing the thresholds for the mean amplitude of the
rotation (indicating the overall presence of movements) and for the
highest amplitude of the rotation rate (indicating abrupt change in
orientation). If these thresholds are exceeded in the recorded trace,
it is considered to be aected by movements, and the trace can be
ignored during the classication. In Section 5.5, we evaluate this
approach for the smartphone being held in hand.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we identify devices on which magnetometers are
aected by the CPU, evaluate the classication performance, show
the success rate of capturing the target activity, and investigate the
impact of minor movements.
5.1 Information leakage
In this experiment, we examined whether the magnetometer read-
ings on mobile devices are aected by the CPU workload. For this
purpose, we produced a predened CPU activity paern on a device
and analyzed resulting sensor disturbances. e paern consists
of alternating high and low CPU loads lasting for 2 seconds. To
produce high loads, we concurrently ran so-called busy waiting
loops in a number of threads, equal to the number of available
logical cores on a device, utilizing up to 100% of the CPU time. To
produce low loads, we paused the execution.
Aerwards, we calculated the correlation between this paern
and recorded measurements. If the device runs Android 7, we were
able to additionally calculate the correlation coecient with the
actual produced CPU activity paern, recorded using /proc/stat.
Some examples of predened paern and corresponding magne-
tometer and /proc/stat recordings are illustrated in Figure 2. We also
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Table 2: List of mobile devices on which magnetometer measurements correlate with
CPU activity. e table shows the cross-correlation between sensor data and expected
CPU activity pattern (Corr.Pattern); for Android≤7, also between sensor data and ac-
tual CPU loads recorded through /proc/stat (Corr.CPU), as well as SNR ratios.
Smartphone Setupa Magnetometer Correlation SNR,
Paern CPUb dB
Essential Products PH-1 V AKM AK09915 0.83 — 10.20
Google Pixel V,A,L AKM AK09915 0.86 0.89 14.70
Google Pixel 2 V,A,L AKM AK09915 0.78 — 10.80
Google Pixel 3 V,A STMicro LIS2MDL 0.90 — 14.20
Google Pixel 3 XL V,A STMicro LIS2MDL 0.91 — 15.40
Google Pixel C V Google CROSEC 0.91 — 27.40
Google Pixel XL V,A AKM AK09915 0.83 0.95 12.20
HTC U Ultra V AKM AK09915 0.95 0.96 28.60
HTC U11 V,A AKM AK09915 0.50 — −9.70
HTC U12+ V AKM AK09915 0.44 — 0.80
Huawei Honor View 10 V AKM AK09918 0.81 — 10.80
Huawei Mate 20 Pro V AKM 0.81 — 20.10
Huawei Mate 10 Pro V AKM 0.87 — 13.00
Huawei Nexus 6P V Bosch BMM150 0.85 0.94 14.50
Huawei P10 V AKM 0.84 0.89 15.80
Huawei P20 Pro V AKM 0.60 — 3.40
Huawei P30 Pro V AKM AK09918 0.54 — 4.20
LG G6 V AKM LGE 0.86 0.88 12.10
LG Nexus 5X V,L Bosch BMM150 0.88 0.93 15.50
LG V30 V AKM LGE 0.93 0.96 22.60
Motorola Moto X(4) V MEMSIC MMC3630KJ 0.82 — 4.20
Motorola Moto g(6) V AKM AK09918 0.54 — 2.90
Motorola Moto Z3 Play V AKM AK09915 0.79 — 13.40
OnePlus 3 V MEMSIC MMC3416PJ 0.92 0.95 14.70
OnePlus OnePlus 6T V AKM AK0991X 0.40 — −0.70
Samsung Galaxy A7 V Yamaha YAS539 0.84 — 13.80
Samsung Galaxy Note 8 V,A AKM AK09916C 0.91 0.95 16.30
Samsung Galaxy Note 9 V,A AKM AK09918C 0.52 — 4.10
Samsung Galaxy S7 V Yamaha YAS537 0.73 — 4.50
Samsung Galaxy S9+ V,A AKM AK09916C 0.55 — 4.20
Samsung Galaxy S10E V,A AKM AK09918C 0.77 — 12.30
Samsung Galaxy S10 V,A AKM AK09918C 0.65 — 7.90
Samsung Galaxy XCover4 V AKM AK09916C 0.89 0.72 −1.60
Sony Xperia XZ2 V AKM AK0991X 0.40 — −3.00
Sony Xperia XZ3 V AKM AK0991X 0.49 — 1.70
Sony Xperia 10 Plus V GlobalMEMS GMC306 0.78 — 8.80
Xiaomi Mi A1 V AKM AK09918 0.82 — 11.00
Xiaomi Mi A2 V AKM AK09918 0.79 — 9.70
a V — Visual Studio App Center; A — AWS Device Farm; L — lab
b CPU /proc/stat data is available only on devices running Android ≤ 7.
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Figure 2: Example of the ex-
pected CPU pattern to be pro-
duced (a), recorded sensor data (b),
and actual CPU pattern recorded
through /proc/stat (c).
measured the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), i.e., the ratio between
the average amplitude of the disturbance caused by the high CPU
load and the standard deviation of measurements without CPU
activity. It allows us to estimate how robust the produced distur-
bance is against environmental and intrinsic noise. To evaluate a
large number of devices, we conducted measurements using two
cloud platforms, Visual Studio App Center [13] and AWS Device
Farm [6]. We selected all available devices running Android 7 or
higher. Additionally, three devices were used in the lab in a typical
oce environment. We could not control the environment of the
devices in the cloud (such as noise), and tested them as is.
We found that magnetometers on 39 out of 59 devices are af-
fected by the CPU activity. Results are shown in Table 2. On most
of the devices, the signal exceeds noise. In further experiments,
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Table 3: Classication accuracy for website and application
ngerprinting in the in-app and in-browser scenarios com-
pared to classication using /proc/stat data. Traces have
been collected on a Google Pixel 2 smartphone in the lab en-
vironment.
Dataset Setup Browser Sampling Accuracy,
Rate, Hz %
Website ngerprinting
sensor in-app Webview 100 90.5
sensor in-app Chrome 100 74.9
sensor in-browser WebView 10 86.7
cpu in-app Webview 50 89.0
Application ngerprinting
sensor in-app 100 90.0
cpu in-app 50 95.8
we conrmed that a SNR of ≈4dB is sucient to establish nger-
printing. Magnetometers on other 20 devices, listed in Appendix A,
were not aected by CPU activity.
As one can see from both tables, the sensor model does not
indicate whether the magnetometer is aected by the CPU: For
example, sensors AKM AK09915 and AKM AK0991X can be found
on both aected and not aected devices. We believe that the
reaction mostly depends on the physical location of the sensor with
regard to the CPU and power wires, and applied shielding.
As a result, we believe that the aack is practical, since modern
popular devices (e.g., recently released smartphones Google Pixel 3
and Samsung Galaxy S10) are all aected.
5.2 Classication results
In this experiment, we evaluated the classication accuracy of our
aack in a so-called closed-world scenario, when the aacker aims
to identify the visited website (application) among a predened list
of websites (applications).
For website ngerprinting, we collected magnetometer and /proc/stat
traces during retrieval of the 50 most popular websites from the
Alexa Top 500 Global Sites list [15], merging websites with multi-
ple domains together (e.g., google.*). We collected 175 traces per
website, with a duration of 12s each. Similarly, for application n-
gerprinting, we collected traces of 65 applications, 175 traces per
application, taken from the list of popular applications [3]. Aer-
wards, we ran the classication using both sensor and /proc/stat
data. e results in terms of classication accuracy are shown in
Table 3. As we can see, the classier performs with an accuracy
of over 80% for website and application ngerprinting. Notably,
the proposed approach has a similar performance in comparison
to the classication based on /proc/stat. ese results indicate that
the magnetometer-based side channel leaks sucient information
about CPU activity.
Classication accuracies for dierent setups are also compared
in Table 3. More specically, we separately tested website retrieval
in an embedded WebView component with cache disabled, as well
as using a full mobile Chrome web browser with cache enabled.
As one can see, the classication results are similar for both cases.
However, the caching does aect the resulting paerns. To be able
Table 4: Classication accuracy for website ngerprinting
in the in-app scenario for several smartphones, for intra-
device and inter-device modes.
Device Setupa Accuracy, %
intra-device inter-device
Google Pixel XL V 62.5 53.2
Google Pixel 2 L 90.5 83.4
Google Pixel 3 V 83.6 80.8
HTC U12+ V 86.6 80.9
Samsung Galaxy Note 9 V 86.4 82.0
Samsung Galaxy S9+ V 81.9 78.1
a V — Visual Studio App Center; L — lab
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Figure 3: Classication accuracy of website ngerprinting
depending on a sampling rate.
to capture both classes during classication, the aacker can include
both cached and uncached datasets in the training phase. We also
achieved 86.7% accuracy with web-based recording of sensors using
Generic Sensor API, which proves the applicability of our method
to the in-browser scenario.
Aerwards, we ran the website ngerprinting experiment on
ve other smartphones in the cloud environment. We calculated the
success rates for intra-device (with a training and testing performed
on individual devices) and inter-device (with a training phase per-
formed on traces from all devices, and testing on individual devices)
modes. e results are summarized in Table 4. Google Pixel XL and
Samsung smartphones performed worse than other devices due to
the lower sampling rate and the lower SNR ratio, respectively. e
activity paerns are also device-specic. erefore, the aacker
may need to train the classier on numerous devices or take into
account the target device model.
Finally, we evaluated how the sampling rate of sensor data grad-
ually aects the classication accuracy. For this purpose, we further
decreased the sampling rate for the dataset of websites recorded in
the in-browser scenario and calculated the resulting classication
accuracies. Figure 3 shows the results. As one can see, the sampling
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Table 5: Classication results for the open-world scenario,
in terms of the True Positive Rate (TPR) and the False Posi-
tive Rate (FPR) for the ve monitored websites.
Website TPR,% FPR,%
facebook.com 48.8 0.01
google.com 41.9 0.00
taobao.com 51.2 0.05
wikipedia.org 86.0 0.15
youtube.com 83.7 0.01
Non-monitored 99.8 37.67
Average (monitored) 62.3 0.04
Average (overall) 68.6 6.32
rate needs to be reduced to less than 1 Hz in order to make the
aack impractical.
5.3 Open-world scenario
In this section, we evaluate our classier in a so-called open-world
scenario. In comparison to the closed-world scenario, a victim can
visit a much larger set of websites not known to the aacker. Con-
sequently, the aacker cannot generalize the classier and identify
every visited website. Instead, the aacker aims to identify whether
a victim visits specic websites, further referred to as monitored
websites. To perform the experiment, we rst collected traces for 50
most popular websites, 175 traces per website, to train the classier
similarly to the closed-world scenario. However, in this case, we
selected ve the most popular websites to be monitored. Other
45 websites were labeled as not monitored, i.e., they belonged to
a separate class. For testing, we used another list of popular web-
sites [10], which is larger than the Alexa list. We collected one trace
for each of the 7,500 most popular websites, excluding 50 websites
used in the training phase. Finally, we collected 40 traces of each
of the ve monitored websites, to have a total of 7,700 traces in the
testing set. All traces were collected on a Google Pixel 2 smartphone
in the in-app recording mode.
To evaluate the results, for each monitored website we calculated
the True Positive Rate (TPR), which represents the ratio of correctly
classied traces of the website to the total 40 traces recorded for
this website, and the False Positive Rate (FPR), which represents
the number of non-monitored traces incorrectly classied as the
monitored website. Table 5 shows the classication results. We can
see that the average achieved TPR of 68.6% is lower in compari-
son to the closed-world scenario, but is still practical. e FPR is,
however, relatively low: 6.3% for all websites and 0.04% for only
monitored websites. e low FPR is especially valuable in the open-
world scenario, as it ensures the aacker that the victim did visit
the monitored website if it was identied by the classier. As a
result, we believe that our approach is applicable to the open-world
scenario.
5.4 Continuous usage
In this experiment, we evaluated the ability of the aacker to de-
tect the starting point of the trace to be classied in a continuous
recording stream. e detection is performed by calculating the
Figure 4: Distribution of traces with regard to their
gyroscope-based metrics for movements. Numerous
wrongly classied traces lie outside the highlighted thresh-
old area.
cross-correlation with the predened paern, as we described in
Section 4.4. We evaluated the approach in the scope of application
ngerprinting and chose the Chrome browser as the target activity.
We made 50 continuous recordings lasting 100s each, and within
every recording we opened the target application and two other
applications at specic non-overlapping time points. e applica-
tions for each recording were randomly chosen. is way, traces
contained the paern corresponding to the target application, as
well as noise from other activities. For each recording, we calcu-
lated the cross-correlation between the recorded trace and a paern
computed for the target application.
en, we detected local maxima (peaks) in the result. e set of
peaks was ltered according to three threshold parameters: peak
height, prominence and width. We considered a peak as true posi-
tive if it was discovered within a 1s-interval around the time point
when the target application was actually opened. Other detected
peaks were considered as false positives. A false negative was as-
sumed if there was no peak within the corresponding interval. In
the end, we calculated the classication precision and recall. For
50 recordings and our set of parameters, we achieved a precision
of 24,5% and 72.9% recall. e aacker can vary parameters of the
cross-correlation to increase the recall at the expense of precision
(i.e., discover more peaks, including false positives), and vice versa.
Finally, we ran the classication at all discovered time points
including false positives. e accuracy in our experiment reached
81%, which is comparable to the 90% achieved in the closed-world
experiment with a known beginning point. e decrease is observed
due to a number of false positives, as the classier in the closed-
world scenario has not being trained on noise data. As a result,
the experiment shows that the aacker can eciently reduce the
amount of data to be processed using the proposed approach.
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Table 6: Comparison with other related works exploiting side-channel information leakage for website and/or application
ngerprinting.
Work Aacka Leakage source Platform Blocked
Jana & Shmatikov [29] WF memory footprint mobile apps Android 7
Zhou et al [49] AF data-usage statistics mobile apps Android 7
Spreitzer et al. [41] WF data-usage statistics mobile apps Android 7
Gulmezoglu et al. [26] WF hardware perf. events desktop apps Android 7
Chen et al. [22] AF power traces (SW) mobile apps Android 8
Clark et al. [23] WF power traces (HW) desktop apps Android 8b
Yang et al. [47] WF power traces (HW) mobile apps Android 8b
Diao et al. [24] AF system interrupts mobile apps Android 8
Spreitzer et al. [43] AF&WF several Android APIs mobile apps not blocked
Spreitzer et al. [42] AF&WF several procfs resources mobile apps not blocked
Shusterman et al. [39] WF cache occupancy desktop browsersc not blockedc
Our work AF&WF magnetometer data mobile apps & browsers not blocked
a WF — website ngerprinting; AF — application ngerprinting
b Aacks use power traces collected using hardware; prevention is specied for sysfs traces
c Evaluation is presented for desktop browsers, but potentially generalizes for mobile platforms
5.5 Robustness to movements
In this experiment, we evaluated the classication accuracy when
the smartphone is being held in hand, and our approach to identify
traces aected by movements described in Section 4.5. We used
the classier trained for the website ngerprinting in the closed-
world scenario on a static device (see Section 5.2). Aerwards, we
recorded a total of 500 test traces while freely holding a smartphone
in hand.
When the classier was applied to the whole test dataset with-
out ltering, the overall accuracy dropped to 64.8%, indicating that
movements do aect the measurements. However, wrongly iden-
tied traces could be ltered out using the proposed approach: in
Figure 4, one can see that for numerous wrongly classied traces
the thresholds for indicating movements are exceeded. By applying
the ltering based on the thresholds before the classication, 21% of
the measurements were identied as aected by movements. Aer
removing aected traces from the dataset, the accuracy reached
73.3%. e accuracy is lower in comparison to the accuracy achieved
for the static device (90.5%), but remains practical. Nevertheless,
a larger user study and more detailed analysis of the impact of
movements may be needed to prove the wide applicability of the
approach.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Website and app ngerprinting on mobile
devices
Researchers have shown that dierent side-channel information
can be used to infer applications and websites opened on a smart-
phone. Jana and Shmatikov [29] observed the memory footprint of a
browser (available through procfs) to enable website ngerprinting.
Zhou et al. [49] and Spreitzer et al. [41] showed that the Android
data-usage statistics API provides precise information about net-
work activity and allows to ngerprint applications and websites.
Gulmezoglu et al. [26] used information about system performance
counters to establish website ngerprinting, whereas Diao et al. [24]
exploited information about system interrupts to establish appli-
cation ngerprinting, with both leakage sources available through
procfs. Several researchers showed that power consumption traces,
collected through sysfs [22, 46], using a malicious charger [46] or
a malicious baery [31], are highly correlated with the CPU ac-
tivity paern, and therefore, also can be used as leakage source
to infer opened applications [22, 46] and websites [23, 31, 47]. Re-
cently, Spreitzer et al. discovered multiple leakage sources available
through procfs [42] and Android APIs [43], which allow inferring
website and application activity. Finally, several works have been
presented on microarchitectural side channels, which can be used to
infer information about visited websites [32, 37]. In the most recent
work, Shusterman et al. [39] demonstrated the cache occupancy
side channel to establish website ngerprinting in the in-browser
scenario.
Table 6 summarizes these prior works and compares them with
our approach. As we can see, most of the leakage sources are al-
ready blocked in the latest Android OS. Furthermore, currently
available procfs resources can be blocked in future versions of An-
droid without serious impact on existing applications as they pro-
vide system-specic technical information. In contrast, our aack
works on the latest Android 9 and access to magnetometer cannot
be completely blocked, since numerous applications rely on magne-
tometer values (e.g., navigation applications). Furthermore, almost
all prior works require a malicious application to be installed on a
device, while our aack can be launched from a web page.
6.2 Exploiting the reaction of magnetometers
to EM activity
e reaction of magnetometers to electromagnetic activity emied
by computer components has been used to establish inter-device
covert channels. Researchers used magnetometers to receive covert
signals from a nearby computer encoded into hard drive activ-
ity [17], CPU activity [27], and combined I/O activity [35]. Recently,
Matyunin et al. [34] proposed a magnetometer-based intra-device
covert channel on smartphones. e authors demonstrated that the
magnetometer can be aected by the peak CPU activity, emied
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by an active aacker from a webpage. In this work, we show that
magnetometer disturbance on smartphones actually correlates with
CPU activity, evaluate this eect on multiple modern smartphones,
and show how it can be passively analyzed to infer running activity,
namely, to perform website and application ngerprinting.
7 COUNTERMEASURES
ere are several possibilities to prevent the presented information
leakage through magnetometer disturbance:
• Physical shielding with ferromagnetic materials is the most
straightforward way to limit the susceptibility of the sen-
sor to electromagnetic activity. However, this measure
opposes an industry trend of making smartphones thinner
and lighter, and cannot protect existing devices from the
aack.
• As we have discovered in our experiments in Section 5.1,
some smartphones and tablets actually do not react to CPU
activity, presumably due to the sensor location relative
to the CPU or power supply components. We, therefore,
believe that the location of the sensors should be taken
into account when designing the layout of the smartphone
motherboard.
• Based on our evaluation in Section 5.2, further limiting the
sensor sampling rate to 1 Hz signicantly reduces the clas-
sication accuracy of ngerprinting. However, with such
a lower sampling rate it may be still possible to infer infor-
mation about more coarse-grained activities. Furthermore,
it may negatively aect the performance of legitimate ap-
plications.
• An explicit user permission can be introduced to limit ac-
cess to magnetometers. However, users may not correctly
perceive potential privacy threats emerging from sensors
in mobile devices [36]. erefore, an explanation of po-
tential risks might be needed. Moreover, a lot of mobile
devices in use run outdated operating system versions [8].
• To limit the aack surface of our aack, access to magne-
tometers can be restricted for applications opened in the
split-screen mode and can immediately be blocked when
the application goes to the background.
e described countermeasures would require hardware or so-
ware changes, may have performance or production cost drawbacks,
and require careful design decisions. erefore, the presented aack
remains completely feasible at present.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a website and application ngerprinting
method for mobile devices based on the reaction of magnetome-
ters to the internal CPU activity. We observed this side channel
on a large number of modern devices and demonstrated that this
information leakage is sucient to identify opened websites and
applications. e presented method does not require any user per-
missions and can be run in both in-app and in-browser scenarios
unnoticed to the end users, posing a signicant threat against the
privacy of mobile users.
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A APPENDIX
Table 7: List of mobile devices and their magnetometers not aected by their CPU activity.
Smartphone Setup Magnetometer
Asus ZenFone 5Z V AKM AK0991X
Google Pixel 2 XL V,A AKM AK09915
LGE LG G7 inQ V,A AKM LGE
Motorola Nexus 6 V,A Invensense Inc.
Motorola Moto G(6) plus V AKM AK09918
Motorola Moto G(7) plus V MEMSIC MMC5603NJ
Motorola One V MEMSIC MMC3630KJ
OnePlus 5T V AKM AK09911
OnePlus 6 V AKM AK0991X
Samsung Galaxy A6+ V Yamaha YAS539
Samsung Galaxy A8 V AKM AK09918
Samsung Galaxy S7 edge V Yamaha YAS537
Samsung Galaxy S8 V,A AKM AK09916C
Samsung Galaxy S8+ V,A AKM AK09916C
Samsung Galaxy S9 V,A AKM AK09916C
Samsung Galaxy S10+ V,A AKM AK09918C
Samsung Galaxy Tab S2 V Yamaha
Samsung Galaxy Tab S3 V,A AKM AK09916
Samsung Galaxy Tab S4 V AKM AK09918
Sony Xperia 10 Plus V GlobalMEMS GMC306
Sony Xperia XZ2 Compact V AKM AK0991X
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